Teesta River Project: How China-Bangladesh MoU Near Siliguri Corridor Threatens India’s Security

By Political Bureau

New Delhi Chronicle

NEW DELHI — In a development that has triggered intense strategic anxiety in New Delhi, Bangladesh and China have officially signed an agreement to accelerate a feasibility study for the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP).

The memorandum of understanding (MoU), signed during Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s official visit to Beijing, marks a sharp departure from the cautious balancing act maintained by the ousted Sheikh Hasina administration. For India, the revival of this mega-infrastructure initiative brings a long-standing Chinese footprint right to the edge of the highly sensitive Siliguri Corridor, colloquially known as the “Chicken’s Neck.”

The Strategic Red Line: Proximity to the Chicken’s Neck

The Teesta River is a 414-km transboundary river that originates in the eastern Himalayas of Sikkim, flows through West Bengal, and enters Bangladesh before merging into the Brahmaputra (Jamuna). The proposed restoration project aims to overhaul the Teesta’s catchment area through extensive river dredging, land reclamation, and the creation of special economic zones.

However, the geographic location of the project areas—primarily in Bangladesh’s Nilphamari and Rangpur districts—is what has set off alarm bells in India’s national security establishment. These regions sit immediately adjacent to West Bengal’s Jalpaiguri district, running within 10 to 12 kilometres of the Indian border.

Most critically, this area borders the Siliguri Corridor. Measuring a mere 22 kilometres at its narrowest point, this land strip serves as India’s sole territorial bridge connecting the northeastern states to the rest of the country. Defense experts warn that any permanent presence of Chinese state-backed personnel in this corridor could jeopardize India’s regional connectivity during a geopolitical crisis.

The Dual-Use Threat of PowerChina

Compounding India’s anxiety is the entity tasked with executing the project. The framework involves PowerChina, a massive state-owned enterprise deeply integrated into Beijing’s military-civil fusion doctrine.

Strategic experts point out that PowerChina is not merely a detached commercial contractor. The company has a documented history of executing dual-use infrastructure across Asia and Africa, where civilian engineering often lays the groundwork for geopolitical and intelligence leverage. Stationing a large contingent of Chinese engineers, surveyors, and technical personnel so close to India’s narrow bottleneck effectively gives Beijing a monitoring post overlooking the Northeast.

National security experts suggest that China’s expanding footprint in Bangladesh reinforces a complex two-front challenge for New Delhi. Analysts argue that while Pakistan attempts to exploit internal vulnerabilities in the Northeast, Beijing’s soft power and infrastructure dominance in Dhaka could transform a local water-sharing issue into a permanent external security threat.

How the Tarique Rahman Government Bypassed India

The $1-billion Teesta project has been in limbo since it was first conceptualized in 2016. Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had withheld final approvals, carefully balancing bilateral ties to avoid provoking India’s security concerns.

Following the political transitions in Dhaka, New Delhi had proactively offered to fund the $1-billion project itself in 2024. However, the political turmoil and subsequent interim administration left India’s proposal hanging. With the newly formed BNP government under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman taking charge, Dhaka shifted its focus back to Beijing. Rahman has pledged to implement the massive Teesta plan “at any cost,” citing the scale of engineering required—which includes reclaiming 171 square kilometres of land and building a 224-km road network.

Furthermore, Bangladesh’s shift toward China highlights the unresolved bilateral deadlock between New Delhi and Dhaka over Teesta water-sharing. Although an interim water pact was drafted in 2010, internal political resistance within India—primarily from West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee—stalled the agreement. Under India’s federal structure, the central government could not move forward without state-level consent, leaving a diplomatic vacuum that China has now readily filled.

India’s Diplomatic Counter-Strategy

Publicly, New Delhi is maintaining a watchful but measured diplomatic posture. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal recently noted that India’s views on the Teesta Project have been firmly conveyed to the Bangladeshi leadership, emphasizing that New Delhi will factor all related developments into its overall approach. Similarly, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri reiterated India’s commitment to ongoing water-management dialogues via the Joint Rivers Commission frameworks.

Nonetheless, strategic analysts advise that India must look beyond traditional bilateral diplomacy to counter Beijing’s aggressive regional encirclement. Experts suggest that New Delhi should accelerate the execution and quality of its own regional infrastructure projects.

Additionally, India could look to collaborate with friendly, non-threatening third-party nations like Japan to co-fund major developments in Bangladesh. Managing political narratives within Indian border states will also remain crucial to maintaining stable, friendly relations with Dhaka moving forward.